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Abstract. Standards have been deeply studied in economics in order to
assure a certain quality of service in bilateral contracts. More specifically,
in multi-agent systems performance standards may be used in order to
articulate contracts among partners in environments dealing with uncer-
tainty. However, little effort has been made on defining how standards
are created and, what is more important, how to ensure standards com-
pliance over time. In this work we put forward a mechanism that, on
one hand, creates standards from roles denoting task specialization skills
and, on the other hand, tries to maintain role performance standards
by applying incentives and/or punishments to agents identified as being
able to play those roles.
1 Introduction
A number of research proposals have been made recently concerning the develop-
ment of infrastructures for supporting interaction in open multi-agent systems.
In such systems agents enter and leave the interaction environment, and be-
have in an autonomous and not necessarily cooperative manner, exhibiting self-
interested behaviours. Even when agents establish commitments among them,
the dynamic nature of the environment may jeopardize such commitments if
agents are not socially concerned enough, valuing more their private goals when
evaluating the new circumstances.
Moreover, in open systems one cannot assume that agents will behave consis-
tently along time. This may happen either because of agent’s ability or benev-
olence. In some cases, an agent may not be capable of maintaining a certain
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behaviour standard throughout its lifetime. In other cases, the agent may inten-
tionally deviate from its previous performance. It is therefore important, when
considering open environments, to take into account also the evolution of an
agent’s internal skills or motivations, besides the dynamics of the interaction
environment as a whole.
Taking an organizational approach, and looking at the society from a role-
specialization perspective, Hermoso has proposed role evolution [6] as a guideline
to develop a coordination mechanism that enables agents to select a partner to
delegate a specific task to. The proposed approach is to look at the agent society
and identify “run-time roles” that cluster agents with similar skills for a (set of)
tasks. From this perspective, the mechanism allows one to identify the role that
labels the agents most suitable to perform a specific task.
Looking at this role taxonomy as an artificial organization, in this paper we
address the problem of organizational maintenance. Given the evolving nature
of agents, as pointed above, a problem faced by the organization in which agents
have been (artificially) embedded is that of timeliness: are the agents within a
role still performing as well as they did at the time of their assessment? Two
different actions can be taken when agents start under-performing. One is to
reorganize so that the role taxonomy becomes accurate again. But assuming
that this reorganization may be costly, another approach is to influence the
agents’ reasoning by making use of incentives or punishments, as an attempt to
keep them on track.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the
preliminaries this paper is based on. We present the standardisation process
from roles in Section 3. Then we put forward a model to establish and adjust
incentives in order to maintain standards over time in Section 4. We relate our
work to others’ in Section 5. Finally, we sum up the paper and sketch the future
work in Section 6.
2 Background
The rationale behind creating and maintaining performance standards relies on
the concept of role proposed by Hermoso et al. [6]. In this work the authors claim
that in a society of agents social relationships may evolve, so roles – defining the
positions of agents in terms of skills and importance as seen from others – should
also do. They use the role as a piece of reasoning when looking for an interaction
partner. The main contribution of the work is that a society of agents may be
covered by an overlay role taxonomy formed by extracting capacities and trust
relationships among agents over time.
Previous work on the field [6] shows a proposal for a coordination mechanism
for open MAS which presents a societal structure where agents try to improve
their individual utilities. In order to do that, agents may interact with others in
the sense that they will delegate certain tasks other agents may carry out. Such
systems are called Task-oriented Multiagent Systems (T-MAS). We assume that
agents in these systems accumulate their experiences of past interactions and
implement some kind of trust model that allows them to establish which agents
are more appropriate as possible interaction partners in the future. Based on
these trust models, that approach evolves role taxonomies and assigns agents
to roles. Agents can then request this information and use it in their decision-
making processes. In particular, they can use the assignments of roles to agents
in order to improve their trust models, that is, in order to evaluate the expected
behaviour or outcome when delegating tasks to or using services from others.
The mechanism has been exhaustively tested in different conditions with open
MAS [6], with heterogeneous and dynamic populations, showing a significantly
good adaptation in order to provide a useful role taxonomy to agents.
The concept of role is often considered from a macro perspective describing
the objectives, goals and also the constraints applied to players in an organiza-
tional context. However, we consider roles from another perspective: as repre-
senting expectations of behaviours. In particular, we consider roles from a micro
perspective (that is, from the perspective of the agents), where the role other
agents are playing in the system provides information about their expected ca-
pacities regarding certain interactions (e.g., the provisioning of certain services
or tasks). The proposed mechanism evolves role taxonomies over time and adapts
itself to changes in the system, which is useful when dealing with the open and
dynamic nature of a MAS. We assume that agents participating in the system
are rational, that is, they try to maximise their utility in every action they plan
to perform. The main task of the mechanism will be twofold: i) capture similar
behaviour among participants that play a role; and ii) manage the role taxonomy
that structures different positions of agents in the system. The mechanism uses
a K-Means clustering algorithm to identify patterns of behaviour, so distinguish-
ing those agents outperforming others and, consequently, being more trusted by
the participants. The input for the clustering is the trust network generated from
the opinions agents have on the trustworthiness of other participants in different
interactions they have had over time.
Next we review some basic notation of previous work in order to correctly
understand the remainder of the paper.
Task-oriented Multi-Agent Systems A Task-oriented Multi-Agent System
(T-MAS) is a multi-agent system in which participants have to perform a set
of tasks. Among this set of tasks, agents will decide based on their capabilities
which ones can be performed by themselves and which others are better to be
delegated to other agents. A T-MAS is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A T-MAS is a tuple TM = 〈Ag, T ,U , OS〉 where Ag stands for
the set of rational agents participating in the system, T is the set of tasks that can
be performed in the system, U represents a function that measures the system’s
global utility at time k and OS ⊆ OS stands for the T-MAS’ organizational
structure. OS denotes all possible subsets of organisational structures.
On the organisational structure, we are particularly interested in role tax-
onomies to articulate coordination in the delegation process. We define a role as
follows:
Definition 2 Let TM be a T-MAS, and let R be a set of unique role labels.
A role in TM is a pair 〈r, Er〉, in which r is the name of the role, and Er =
{t1, ..., tn} with ti ∈ T is a finite set of tasks.
The intended semantics of a role 〈r, Er〉 is that agents playing the role r are
qualified “performers” of the tasks contained in Er, in the sense that they are
“good” in performing any of those tasks. We assume that agents could perform
any task in the T-MAS, but they may only be well qualified for some of them. For
instance, in the world of conference program committees a role of GA expert is
more specific than the role reviewer for reviewing papers on Genetic Algorithms.
Based on the definition of role above, we define a role specialization taxonomy.
Definition 3 Let TM = 〈Ag, T ,U , {∆R}〉 be a T-MAS, and R a set of unique
role labels, a specialization role taxonomy in TM is a structure ∆R = 〈Π,Br〉,
containing a set of roles Π (over R and T ), and a partial order relationship.
Role specialisation taxonomies have the following two main properties: i)
Inception: there exists a root role (〈rroot, Eroot〉) that contains every achiev-
able task (T ) in the T-MAS and that is not a specialisation of any other. This
property reflects the assumption on the possibility of any agent to perform any
type of task. Therefore, any agent in Ag can play, at least, the role 〈rroot, Eroot〉
in TM , and ii) Specialisation: there exists a partial order relationship that
defines the taxonomy (Br), based on the different expectations that agents have
on those who play distinct roles, or in other words, the quality with which those
other agents play different roles. That is, given two different roles 〈r1, E1〉 and
〈r2, E2〉 ∈ Π, the relationship 〈r1, E1〉 Br 〈r2, E2〉 holds iff. there exists a subset
of tasks in E1 for which those agents that play the role 〈r2, E2〉 are expected to
perform better on average than the agents playing role r1.
3 Creating standards from roles
Although in previous work [6] the focus was on providing a role specialization
taxonomy in order to better estimate trust on others in a T-MAS, in this pa-
per we try to go beyond by claiming that this notion of specialized role may
also be used to allow establishing performance standards and so facilitating the
agreement on contracts among agents.
We therefore aim at going from roles as expectations of behavior [12] to the
explicit handling of such expectations as conventions and further as norms [2]
that are committed to. Our approach is to assign a performance standard to every
task specialized in a role, so allowing agents to formulate normative contracts
and reason about them (commit, refuse, fulfill, ...).
3.1 Standard creation
Let X be the set of attributes that characterizes any task in T . For instance,
in an e-commerce domain x ∈ X = {delivery time, quality} would be a set of
attributes that might characterize the task supply a good. Let x¯ be a set of
possible values for x, where x¯i corresponds to a value for the attribute xi. For
example, x¯ = {5 ,B} means that the value for the attribute delivery time is 5
and the quality of the good is of type B.
Firstly we define the concept of standard:
Definition 4 A standard ς is a tuple 〈r, t, x, x¯〉 that establishes, for a role r
and a task t, a certain expected level of quality for a set of attributes x.
The level of quality of different attributes is meant to be a target (x¯i) that
separates acceptable behavior of an agent performing a task t from less preferred
behavior for the same task.
In the literature, the concept of standard has mainly been used in economics,
especially in commerce finances and industry, where it defines what is expected
(in terms of outcomes) from a commercial interaction or an industrial process,
respectively. This notion of standard fosters interactions among different stake-
holders in a system by allowing to enact contracts in terms of standard’s at-
tributes (and its corresponding values) they adhere to. Analogously as it occurs
with roles, the inherent nature of open systems makes it complicated to define
standards a priori for any kind of process. In the case of T-MAS, the potentially
changing environment (regarding the system’s population and agents’ behav-
iors) makes necessary the use of evolution mechanisms in order to update orga-
nizational structures (in our case role taxonomies). Since standards are directly
related with the notion of task and role, the evolving nature of the latter entails
also evolution of standards over time.
In Section 2 we summarized a previous work on role evolution to cover this
issue. In that approach roles are created with the aim of allowing a more accurate
partner selection process in T-MAS, thus roles are considered as specializations
of agents skilled to perform (with a sufficient quality) a certain set of tasks.
The authors propose there to use subjective information based on agents’ trust
models to aggregate societal opinions about the goodness of every individual in
the system on their performance carrying out different tasks.
In this paper we claim that once this role evolution mechanism is in place,
roles may be used to create standards which, in turn, can be included in con-
tracts that regulate interactions in the system. The underlying idea relies on the
aggregation of values of different attributes that characterize (the performance
of) a task within the role, to establish a standard for that role/task pair, as
defined in Def. 4.
Let TM be a T-MAS with a set of roles Π and a role specialization taxonomy
∆R = 〈Π,Br〉. We use a function f : Π × T → S (role to standard) where S
is the set of possible standards for the task in T specialized by the role in
Π. Algorithm 1 shows the description of function f . Input parameters for this
function are the role from which the standard is created and one of the tasks the
role is specialized for. The first loop takes the attributes the task is characterized
by (line 1). Then there is a double loop in which the algorithm aggregates the
values of the attributes xi (x¯i) gathered from the agents in the system regarding
those agents assigned to role r when performing task t (lines 2, 3 and 4). Function
ag(r) returns the set of agents playing the role r. The aggr function might be
implemented in several ways, e.g. by weighting differently the information coming
from different agents. Function e (line 4) is defined as eak : Ag×T ×X → X¯ . Thus
eak(a1, buy cotton, delivery time) = 5.3 means that agent ak has experienced an
average delivery time of 5.3 days when buying cotton to agent a1. We assume
that there is a monitoring process periodically launched in charge of annotating
actual outcomes for every attribute in the system. Thus function e retrieves
information already gathered. For every different attribute the algorithm stores
a standard value (line 7). This value might again be calculated in different ways,
e.g. by using an arithmetic mean. Finally, a vector of standard values for that
pair 〈r, t〉 is returned. For instance, in open electronic markets (e.g. eBay) roles
might be created in order to place providers in different categories of provision,
while standards would emerge in order to ensure better interaction processes,
and so keep agents from undesirable behaviors, such as longer delivery times,
price changes, decrease of quality, etc.
Algorithm 1 RoleToStandard process
Require: 〈r, Er〉 ∈ Π {the role to use}
Require: t ∈ Er
1: for xti ∈ X t do
2: for ak ∈ Ag do
3: for aj ∈ ag(r) do
4: values[i]← aggr(values[i], eak (aj , t, xti))
5: end for
6: end for
7: stdV alues[i]← stdEval(values[i])
8: end for
9: return stdV alues
In the perspective of the role taxonomy, where roles specialize tasks, the se-
mantics of a role entails a list of tasks the role is specialized for, but not address-
ing objectively measurable quantitative information. In the case of standards,
these are specific values that can be used to specify the terms of a contract.
We assume that any task in a T-MAS is characterized as a multi-attribute en-
tity, which means that the quality or measurement of its performance will be
assessed in terms of those attributes. For instance, a task Supply cotton might
be characterized by different attributes such as delivery time, origin or color.
Although we define standards as a set of attribute values related with a cer-
tain task performance, standards can be used as a means to articulate contracts.
Thus a contract could be seen as an agreement, between at least two parties, in
which the counterparts know about the standards to be fulfilled. Formally:
Algorithm 2 Standard matching process for requester agent ak
Require: ak {Requester agent}
Require: t ∈ T {The task agent ak is interested in}
Require: S ∈ S {Denotes the set of standards on t in the repository}
1: for s ∈ S do
2: eval[s]← mak (s, t)
3: end for
4: eval← sort(eval)
5: return eval
Definition 5 A contract is a tuple 〈ai, aj , ςk〉, in which ai, aj ∈ Ag and ςk =
〈r, t, x, x¯〉 ∈ S.
Following the definition above, the meaning of a contract is as follows: agent
ai agrees with agent aj that the latter shall fulfill a standard ςk when executing
a task t the standard ςk refers to.
3.2 Standards dynamics
Once the standards have been created for every role-task pair in the T-MAS it
is necessary to explain how those standards become part of contracts between
different stakeholders in the system. Let ak be an agent willing to request a task
(or a service) t. There exists a repository that collects standards (created from
the current taxonomy) in the T-MAS. Agent ak will look up which standard on
t it is more interested in. Let us call this process standard matching process. This
process is detailed in Algorithm 2. This algorithm attempts to rate the potential
standards the agents might be adhered to with a numerical value. Function
mak : S × T → R is used to encapsulate the matching rate of the agent ak’s
preferences to the current standards in the system (lines 1–3). That is, agent ak
has freedom of choice among the standards that the system provides. Typically
rates will be in the range [0, 1]. The algorithm returns a sorted list of standards
ordered by their ratings (lines 4–5).
However, a contract involves profit and risk sharing between the two parties:
the requester agent and the provider [9]. Thus, once the agent has selected a
standard that considers good enough for her expectations, then it needs to look
for providers in the system that want to adhere to the proposed standard and
so perform the task. This is designed by using a typical contract-net protocol we
name Call For Standard Acceptance protocol (CFSA protocol). In this protocol,
the initiator sends a call for standard (s) acceptance to every agent ai ∈ ag(r)
such that s was created from r. The potential providers evaluate the proposal
by using an instance of the function m. Nevertheless, providers use m to match
their preferences with the standard proposed by the initiator trying to rate the
convenience of an eventual acceptance. If the proposal evaluation is reasonably
promising for the provider then the standard proposal is accepted, otherwise is
refused. Among the agents that replied with an acceptance the initiator must
choose one to finally formalize a contract and eventually perform the interaction.
This selection process is out of the scope of this paper.
4 Maintaining performance standards through incentives
After we have explained the path from roles as expectations to committed con-
tracts based on standards, we are now in a position to elaborate on enforcement
schemes that enable us to maintain the stability of the role taxonomy, which is
obtained as explained in Section 2. We will base our approach in the well known
principal-agent model [7, 1] from economics, in which a principal (a service re-
quester) requests an agent (the provider) to perform a specific task.
The outcome of the task execution affects the principal’s utility, and therefore
the latter will be interested in influencing the efforts that the agent puts when
performing the task. Those efforts are expressed in terms of available actions,
which have associated execution costs. In the so-called hidden action setting
there is an assumption that the actual actions executed by the agent are un-
observable to the principal. Instead, only some performance measures of such
actions are observed. The actions determine, usually stochastically, the obtained
performance. Performance is therefore a random variable whose probability dis-
tribution depends on the actions taken by the agent. This stochastic nature
captures the fact that there are externalities in the environment that the agent
does not control. The principal will therefore want to establish an incentive
schedule in order to encourage the agent to choose the actions better leading to
an intended performance standard.
4.1 Targeting standards
As described in Section 3, standards are generated through the use of an aver-
aging function applied to task execution outcomes of a group of provider agents
that have been clustered within a specific role. Since, according to our model,
standards allow requesters to identify expected values for the outcomes of tasks
when executed by a specific provider, we consider a standard as a target that
agents should meet. Any deviation from the standard is considered as a sub-
optimal outcome. Figure 1 illustrates this idea, where ς represents the target
standard that the requester expects, and each concentric circle labelled with a δi
denotes equidistant performances to the target. These concentric lines highlight
the fact that we shall consider deviations in any direction (left or right, upwards
or downwards) to be equally harmful in terms of expected values. The arrow
pointing towards the centre discloses the aims of our incentive-based approach,
with which we will try to encourage providers to better target the standard.
In our model, we will assume that each provider has a set of actions at
his disposal, each with a cost and a probability function for obtaining different
performance outcomes. As follows from Figure 1, an outcome is seen as a distance
to the intended standard values. This allows us to think of actions as efforts the
provider puts in when executing a given task: the more effort is invested, the
Fig. 1. A standard as a target
higher the likelihood that the obtained outcome will be closer to the standard.
Of course, expending more effort also means bearing a higher cost.
4.2 Actions, outcomes and incentives
More formally, and following a finite model for actions and outcomes, we have
that:
– The provider has an ordered set of possible actions A = {a1, ..., an}, where
ai ≺ aj if i < j. This means that Cost(ai) < Cost(aj) (ai is less costly to
the provider than aj).
– The possible observable outcomes that the provider may obtain is an ordered
set X¯ = {x¯1, ..., x¯m}, where x¯i ≺ x¯j if i < j (x¯i is a worse performance than
x¯j). For simplification, we will assume that x¯i ∈ [0, 1], for all i ∈ [1,m]: each
x¯i will denote the percentage of the target standard that has been achieved.
– There is a probability distribution function for X¯ given an action in A, where
p(x¯k|ai) is the probability of obtaining outcome x¯k ∈ X¯ when performing
action ai ∈ A. We have that
∑m
k=1 p(x¯k|ai) = 1, for all i ∈ [1, n].
We assume that the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) [1], relating
actions with outcomes (as defined in Def. 6), holds for every provider. This prop-
erty indicates that greater efforts are more likely to produce better outcomes.
Definition 6 The monotone likelihood ratio property holds iff for any ai, aj ∈
A with ai ≺ aj we have that the likelihood ratio p(x¯k|ai)/p(x¯k|aj) is non-
increasing in k.
Incentives are specified through an incentive schedule mapping possible out-
comes to payments to be collected by the provider:
– Function I : X¯ → I maps each possible outcome in X¯ to a specific incentive
value in I. We assume that I is non-decreasing, that is, I(x¯1) ≤ ... ≤ I(x¯m),
meaning that higher outcomes must have at least the same incentive as
lower ones. Furthermore, we look at incentives as producing some change in
the utility the agent would get if no incentives were in place; in this sense,
I = {ι : ι ∈ [−1, 1]}, where positive values denote percentage increases in
utility and negative values denote percentage decreases in utility (i.e., they
are seen as penalties). When ι = 0 there is no incentive in place.
Based on the stochastic model of action outcomes explained above, each
provider is taken to be expected utility maximizer. Therefore, when choosing
the action to perform it will maximize expected utility [11]:
arg max
a∈A
Ea =
m∑
i=1
p(x¯i|a)u(I(x¯i))− Cost(a) (1)
where u(I(x¯i)) is the utility the agent gets from obtaining performance outcome
x¯i. More precisely, this utility is not directly dependent on performance, but on
the payment I(x¯i) it will get from such a performance.
Given a task execution with an actual outcome and an incentive schedule,
the provider’s utility is given by
U(S, x¯, a) = u(I(x¯))− Cost(a) (2)
Function u : I → [0..1] is the utility function for the incentive received, which
is taken to be strictly increasing. We assume that risk aversion is an internal
characteristic of provider agents. In order to implement this function we use a
sigmoid approach as follows:
u(I(x¯)) =
1
1 + e−I(x¯)∗B+κ
(3)
where κ ∈ R represents a parameter to tune the center of the sigmoid function
and B is a constant in N+. Thus different κ values reveal that when a provider
agent is not offered any incentive, function u(I(x¯)) returns a default value repre-
senting the personal gain the agent gets from the contract (driven by the value
of κ) regardless of how it performs. Back to Equation 2, u(I(x¯)) somehow de-
termines the utility of the actions according to the incentives provided. Thus
negative incentives provided to the agent (punishment) results in lower utility
for the provider whilst higher incentives results in a higher utility. The κ value
encapsulates different characteristics of the agent, such as capability, willingness,
cooperativeness, dependency, attitude, etc. Varying κ we obtain different profiles
of provider agents with different default gain values.
4.3 Deviations and responses
Given the previous performance of each provider, on which standards (via roles)
have been defined (as described in Section 3), one might ask why those agents
may start to under-perform, in the sense that they are not able to meet the
standards they agree with in a contract. We identify two possible sources for
such deviations, which naturally come to surface from analyzing Equation 1:
– The cost of actions has increased, leading the agent to choose actions that do
not obtain the same level of performance (because those actions have lower
probabilities for each possible performance outcome);
– The probabilities for the performance outcomes of an action have changed,
e.g. due to environmental factors not under the control of the agent, meaning
that a same action is not as effective as before.
In this paper we do not address the issue of how the agent becomes aware of
these changes in order to take them into account when deciding which action to
perform (according to Equation 1). In both cases we can easily think of external
factors causing these changes. For instance, in a supply chain, fluctuations on
prices for different inputs (e.g. parts or raw materials obtained from suppliers)
will certainly influence the cost of executing the task. As for outcome probabil-
ities, the agent may be able to update these estimations on-line, according to
run-time experience.
These deviations in performance make the role clustering (obtained as de-
scribed in Section 2) unfit to represent the current performances of agents in the
T-MAS, in terms of the standards extracted from the roles. Therefore, in order
to maintain role stability when agents deviate from agreed standards, the system
may determine and employ an appropriate incentive schedule I : X¯ → I. Since
actions are not observable, this schedule is based exclusively on the measurable
outcomes of task execution. As mentioned in Section 4.2, an outcome denotes
the percentage of the target standard that has been met.
Unlike typical approaches in game theory, we do not assume that action
costs, their probability distributions on outcomes, or utility functions on incen-
tive values are known to the incentive policy maker. Thus, we see the problem of
searching for an optimal incentive schedule as a reinforcement learning (RL) [10]
problem. We assume that the principal prefers higher outcomes with the lowest
incentives needed.
In any reinforcement learning problem, an agent (the incentive policy maker
in our case) perceives the environment and determines the state it is facing.
Based on this state, it will try to determine, by exploring its action set, the best
possible action in terms of a reward obtained from the environment. The goal of
the learning agent is to maximize the reward it receives in the long run. Rewards
are used in RL to tell the learning agent what we want it to achieve, not how
to achieve it. Therefore, rewards are strongly connected with arrival states as
a consequence of the action (an incentive schedule) that the agent chooses to
employ. It may be the case that a particular incentive schedule only obtains the
desired effect a number of iterations after it has been applied.
We see our problem as a continuing task that the learner needs to solve.
Furthermore, because of the sources for deviating behaviors identified above,
providers may decide differently when facing a specific incentive schedule at
different times. Reinforcement learning naturally encompasses this kind of situ-
ations by allowing for an adjustable trade-off between exploitation (taking ad-
vantage of the actions that have been found as good) and exploration (trying
out other actions whose effect is not totally known).
In the following subsections we briefly discuss how states, actions and rewards
can be addressed in the problem faced by the incentive policy maker.
States. A state is characterised by the performance outcomes the agents be-
longing to a given role are currently obtaining. States exhibiting performances
farther away from the target standard need to be addressed with stronger incen-
tive policies. On the other hand, states that denote abidance to agreed standards
need no intervention from the policy maker.
The first issue to take into account is related with the meaning of “timeli-
ness”: the state encompasses information regarding the most recent task execu-
tions of agents within a role. The aggregation of such data may take different
forms, depending on how role performance quality is to be interpreted. One
possibility is to average over the last executions:
role perf =
(
t∑
i=t−∆
x¯i
)
/∆
where t is the current time step, x¯i denotes outcome obtained at time step i and
∆ is the size of the time window, i.e. the number of task executions to consider.
Another possibility is to consider the worse task execution as a reference, with
the aim of obtaining a more sensitive and pro-active incentive mechanism:
role perf = min(x¯t−∆, ..., x¯t)
This would indicate that the policy maker wants every agent within the role to
perform equally well.
In order to reduce the size of the state space, states are discretized according
to the number of levels of deviation that are to be addressed differently, as
illustrated in Figure 1. In order to discretize the obtained value, we define a
δ parameter that tells us in how many intervals we should split the distance
to target standards (which is always a value between 0 and 1, interpreted as a
percentage of the target that has been achieved, as explained before):
state =
{
1 if role perf = 1
brole perf ∗ δc /(δ − 1) if role perf < 1
This function ensures that we will have δ possible states, represented by values
within [0, 1]. If role performance is maximum (i.e. 1), then the state denotes an
optimal situation; as performances get farther from 1, higher δ values will bring
us more quickly to different (less desirable) states.
Actions3. Available learner actions concern incentive schedules I that specify,
for any x¯ ∈ X¯ , an incentive value ι ∈ I. As mentioned in Section 4.2, this
3 We emphasize that these are the learner’s actions (i.e., those available to the incentive
policy maker), and not the actions of the provider agent as discussed in Section 4.2.
We here use the same term action because it is well established in RL literature.
function I is non-decreasing (better outcomes should not receive lower incentives
than worse outcomes).
Based on the approach described in [1], each action can be represented as
an incentive vector ι = (ι1, ..., ιm), where m is the number of possible outcomes,
each ιi ∈ I and, as already mentioned, ιi ≤ ιj for all i < j. In order to reduce
the action space, we can consider only actions within the set bI ∗ 10c /10, which
gives us discrete action values with 0.1 steps.
Depending on the number of outcomes to consider, this may still give us a big
number of actions to experiment with. In any case, given the MLRP property
described in Def. 6 and the fact that providers are expected utility maximizers,
we may be able to guide the way exploration of different actions is carried out.
Techniques such as action refinement [5] can also be a very useful approach here.
Rewards. Just as states can be defined differently depending on the level of
granularity we need the system to respond to, different reward configurations can
help us tune the goal we want the learner to pursuit. An incremental approach
to assigning rewards to different states will help the agent to find which states
are more likely to be in the path to the best possible outcomes. If, on the other
hand, we need the learner to quickly influence providers to escape from undesired
outcomes, only states in which the outcomes are at the target standard should
be awarded.
Assuming that we want to minimize the incentives needed to obtain a certain
level of performance, the cost of implementing a specific incentive schedule must
be taken into account when choosing among actions. In RL, quality values of the
form Q(s, a) are computed that determine the expected return for executing an
action a in a state s. It is therefore important to consider, when computing Q
values, the estimated costs of such actions. It should be noted that these costs do
not result automatically from deciding to implement a specific incentive schedule;
instead, they depend on the actual performances that such a schedule has lead
to, since incentives are paid (if positive) or collected (if negative) according to
actual outcomes.
5 Related work
In this paper we have attempted to put forward a theoretical approach in order to
build standards from roles in dynamic task-oriented MAS. Although the creation
of standards has been more deeply studied in the fields of economics and finance,
in the MAS community there have been some attempts to dynamically build
social structures to foster interactions. For instance, there are many approaches
on how norms are formed and how they emerge from expectations. In [12] the
authors present a work that gathers users expectations for social interactions to
transform then into logic formulae that can be used in order to check an eventual
outcome. The main difference with our approach is that they use explicit requests
to the users to gather their expectations, while we automatise that process by
using the role creation mechanism. Other approaches related to this issue are [2]
and [4], in which the authors put forward how prescriptions might emerge from
individual expectations eventually forming norms.
There are economic approaches also founded on the emergence of standards,
such as [9], in which Sherstyuk proposes a method to set an appropriate per-
formance standard to develop optimal contracts, i.e., contracts in which the
provider agent’s best choice is to keep the standard through its action. In this
paper, however, we are not interested in obtaining optimal performance stan-
dards, but we are instead concerned about how to maintain the level of those
standards once they have been created.
In the same line Centeno et al. [3] present an approach on adaptive sanction
learning by exploring and identifying individuals’ inherent preferences without
explicit disclose of information, i.e. the mechanism learns over which attributes
of the system should modifications be applied in order to induce agents to avoid
undesired actions. In our case, we adhere to a more formal scenario, in which
interactions are regulated by means of contracts and, besides, we assume that
attributes that may be modified by means of incentives are already known by
the mechanism.
The approach taken in [8] also assumes that the mechanism knows which
attributes it should tweak in order to influence agents’ behaviors, namely by
adjusting deterrence sanctions applicable to contractual obligations agents have
committed to. The notion of social control employed there is similar to our notion
of role standard maintenance, although instead of a run-time discovered standard
a fixed threshold is used to guide the decisions of the policy maker. Moreover,
only sanctions (seen as fines) are used to discourage agents from misbehaving,
while here we are more interested on incentivating agents to do their best (by
using appropriate actions) while executing the tasks they are assigned to.
6 Conclusions and future work
Standards are used as a means to articulate contracts in social interactions.
When dealing with organisational multi-agent systems, roles might be used as a
reference in order to create standards, since the latter can be seen as a measure
of the quality of performance of agents playing them. In this paper we have
proposed a mechanism that, on the one hand, creates performance standards
from roles discovered at run-time in a multi-agent system and, on the other
hand, provides incentives to make agents maintain a level of performance as
close as possible to the standards. Some possible applications of this approach
cover from manufacturing systems, in which agents playing different roles when
building a craft are supposed to meet and maintain a standard during their
work, to social systems such as ruled electronic markets, where while standards
may not be known a priori, they can be discovered at runtime and artificially
maintained for the sake of the overall market community.
An issue that we have intentionally left outside this exercise is the decision
regarding when it is less costly to rearrange the role taxonomy than to em-
ploy incentive mechanisms to keep the current configuration’s quality. This is
something left for future work.
We intend to pursue the mechanism presented in this paper, first by refining
the learning model of the incentive policy maker, and second by building a
simulation that enables us to confirm and improve on the virtues of the proposed
approach. It is our belief that the incentive mechanism to develop includes some
interesting modeling choices that may be suitable in some application domains.
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